We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs. We provide a dynamic extension of Romer (1994) in an endogenous growth setting, see Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1990 , Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) . 
Two implications of our model are worth emphasizing from the start. First, the estimated static costs of trade restrictions for the LDC are smaller than the dynamic costs of trade restrictions if, and only if, the increase in trade restrictions reduces the share of invented intermediate goods introduced on the market. In this dynamic setting it is therefore not the fact that we ignore the Dupuit triangles of newly invented goods in estimating the effects of an increase in trade restrictions, but the fact that an increase in trade restrictions affects the share of goods introduced on the LDC market. Second, as a result of the sunk-cost nature of the set-up costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path of the LDC economy after a change in trade
restrictions. An increase in the level of trade restrictions will slow-down economic growth and put the economy on a transition path to a new balanced growth rate. If the new level of trade restrictions exceeds a critical value, the new growth rate will be zero and stagnation occurs. If trade restrictions fall, on the other hand, the LDC economy may embark on a rapid catch-up process of economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of previously-invented-but-not-yetintroduced intermediate goods which may now, as a result of increased profitability, be introduced on the LDC market. Section 6 discusses some empirical evidence supporting this asymmetric adjustment path.
After providing the structure of our model (section 2), we analyze the fraction of intermediate goods introduced on the LDC market (section 3) and balanced growth paths (section 4). We then analyze policy changes and (asymmetric) adjustment dynamics (section 5), followed by a general discussion (section 6) and some conclusions (section 7).
The model
Our analysis focuses on a small developing economy (LDC) Ethier (1982) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) . It is well-known that an increase in the number of varieties available in the economy leads to higher productivity through a positive externality effect. Since we focus on the introduction of new intermediate goods, we keep the level of employment constant. Our objective is to explain the level of economic development in a dynamic setting and illustrate various types of welfare costs of imposing trade restrictions or other impediments to economic interaction with the rest of the world (RoW). To do this, we have in mind a Romer (1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) type endogenous growth model giving rise to an ever expanding variety of intermediate goods in RoW. Since the LDC economy is small, we make two simplifying assumptions, namely (i) the LDC economy cannot influence the economic growth rate in RoW (cf. Rutherford and Tarr, 2002) and (ii) the LDC economy does not engage in any R&D activity to develop new types of intermediate goods.
Assumption (ii) implies that the LDC depends on R&D activity in RoW for introducing new types of intermediate goods, which is in accordance with the empirical results of Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997) and Connolly (2003) . Assumption (i), in combination with the 2 The notation . t signals that the income level may depend on historical developments, see below. Some restrictions of our production function are discussed in section 6. Other things equal, the size of the economy as measured by ) (t L affects discounted profits and therefore the attractiveness of introducing goods on the market. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, in our setting it is in general not the growth rate that is affected, but the share of invented goods that is introduced. 
To determine the range of intermediate goods actually introduced on the LDC market, we confront the costs and benefits of introduction for the inventor of a particular intermediate good.
Starting with the latter, we will assume that the monopolistic producer of an intermediate good (who has the sole property rights to selling this good) can produce one unit of the intermediate good at a constant marginal cost of 1. To enable us to investigate the dynamic effects of trade restrictions, we will assume that the LDC government requires a payment of tariff T for the import of foreign goods. 3 The foreign producers of intermediate goods take this tariff rate as given and assume that it will be applied indefinitely. answer is yes if the discounted value of operating profits is larger than the set-up costs.
Otherwise, the answer is no, see the indicator function ) , ( t i I in (11) and (3'). Note that the net profits derived from introducing a variety on the LDC market depend only on the tariff and the set-up cost for that particular variety.
[ ] 
will be available on the LDC market, see Figure 1 . The figure also illustrates how a reduction in the variation of set-up costs leads to a more rapid increase in the share of goods on the LDC market for a given reduction in
however, that the share itself may be either higher or lower (since ) ( ) ( the lower operating profits will lead to a strict fall in the share of goods introduced on the LDC market. For ease of reference we will call these critical values upper T and lower T , defined as: M is the measure of firms, it follows that: 
total welfare is just the discounted value of instantaneous welfare, the optimal LDC policy is to impose no trade restrictions at all, leading to total welfare )
. In this section, which ignores transition dynamics, the increase in available varieties (equal to the growth rate of the economy) is dictated by progress in RoW (equal to g ). The next section demonstrates not only that the LDC economy evolves over time to the balanced growth path, but also that the change in the LDC growth rate and the level of income can be substantial if we allow for changes in government policy and incorporate transition dynamics.
Proposition I. The LDC balanced growth path is given in (A1)-(A3). Income, welfare, and the share of introduced intermediate goods all increase if the level of trade restrictions falls.

Policy changes and transition dynamics
A crucial aspect of our model is the sunk cost nature of the set-up costs. This implies that once a good has been introduced on the LDC market it will continue to be supplied independently of subsequent changes in the level of trade restrictions. The income level is therefore path-dependent (hysteresis) and the economic response to changes in government policy is asymmetric, see van Marrewijk and Berden (2004) for further details on this section.
Policy change experiment. Suppose the government of the developing country imposes a tariff level 0 T from time 0 to time 1 t . We assume that (i) within this time frame it is expected that this tariff level will be maintained indefinitely, (ii) a positive fraction of newly invented goods is introduced on the LDC market (
), and (iii) the LDC economy is initially on a balanced growth path ( 
T T < ).
An increase in trade restrictions. We distinguish between two groups of intermediate goods producers, which together give rise to the measure of active firms given in (14).
The first group consists of all intermediate goods producers who entered the LDC market before the policy change at time period 1 t . Since the set-up costs are sunk costs, they will remain active despite the policy change. Consequently, some of these producers will ex post conclude that they have made the wrong decision as the discounted value of operating profits turns out to be lower than the set-up costs. 
Static and dynamic costs of an increase in trade restrictions. The main economic implications
for the LDC are illustrated in Figure 2 . At the time of the policy change there is an immediate reduction in the income level (indicated by the arrow in the figure) , 6 Also note that if the policy change was already anticipated t periods prior to its implementation ('partial anticipation'), there would be an adjustment path of the economy starting at t t − 1 with associated higher 'partially-anticipated dynamic costs'. The dynamic costs discussed in the paper and illustrated in Figure 3 provide the lower bound for such 'partially-anticipated dynamic costs', while Romer's expected costs provide the upper bound. Both are therefore useful benchmarks for the likely true range of dynamic costs. Figure 3 illustrates We extended Romer's (1994) argument on the importance of endogenously determining the number of varieties available on the LDC market for a proper understanding of the potentially devastating consequences of imposing trade restrictions, to a simple dynamic setting which allowed us to derive balanced growth paths and explicit transition dynamics. The (short-run) static costs of trade restrictions take the number of varieties as given, whereas the (long-run) dynamic costs take the endogenous determination of future acces to succesful R&D projects undertaken elsewhere into due consideration. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 and in Table 1 for some alternative parameter settings, the dynamic costs of trade restrictions can be substantial in our model even for tariff rates of 10-20% and are generally much larger than the static costs of trade restrictions. Table 1 also illustrates that the static costs do not vary with the rate of time preference, the rate of innovation, and the minimum or maximum set-up costs, whereas the dynamic costs increase if the set-up costs rise (implying that a smaller range of varieties is introduced on the LDC market) or if the rate of innovation rises. As usual in this kind of setting, the impact of an increase in the rate of time preference is ambivalent as the higher long-run future welfare loss may be offset by the higher preference for consuming today. The most important parameters for determining the dynamic costs are the rate of innovation g and the parameter α .
Interpreting changes in the latter is complicated, however, in view of its dual role in our model.
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Our model predicts an asymmetric adjustment process, with a potentially more rapid increase in GDP growth after a decrease in trade restrictions than the decrease in GDP growth after an increase in trade restrictions. To test this implication of the model we combined Sachs and Warner's (1995) increase in operating profits, be introduced on the LDC market. This is also discussed, for example, in Romer (2007) , who notes: "After independence, India's commitment to closing itself off and striving for self-sufficiency was as strong as Taiwan's commitment to acquiring foreign ideas and participating fully in world markets. The outcomes -grinding poverty in India and opulence in Taiwan -could hardly be more disparate." In general, our model predicts that a decline in prosperity following increases in trade restrictions is more gradual than the possible increases in prosperity following reductions in trade restrictions. We provide some empirical support for this implication.
Appendix
I. Balanced growth. Using (7), (12), and (13) gives (A1). Government revenue G is given in (A2). Instantaneous welfare W for the small developing economy is the sum of government revenue and labor income, see (A3), where the first inequality follows from ignoring some negative terms, after which we use sequentially 1 ) 1 ( = − ε α , the fact that 0 N β is equal to the measure of active firms at time 0 together with the second part of (4), (6), and (7), and again the optimal pricing rule (6).
II. Policy change dynamics. Using (14) for an increase in trade restrictions gives:
Similarly, using (14') for a decrease in trade restrictions, we get: 
